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Introduction 
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution (FDRE constitution) has taken 
a bold step in recognizing and promoting ethno-linguistic and religious divert in the 
country. To this effect, it has specifically granted mandate to customary and religious 
system in settlement of disputes on matters affecting personal status of individuals.  The 
legal pluralism recognized by the constitution gives rise to plurality of sources of 
normative ordering that could potentially conflict with state laws, and especially with the 
supremacy clause of the constitution and human rights provisions enshrined under the 
constitution. This is the case with matters falling within the competence of sharia courts 
that are to be resolved by the application of Islamic law, which has a different conception 
and approach towards the rights of women in general and gender equality in divorce, 
inheritance, sharing of estate upon divorce, etc. The decisions rendered by sharia courts 
using Islamic rules could conflict with rules human rights norms in general and rules on 
gender equality, protection of against discrimination on any ground, etc that are 
enunciated under the Constitution.  This paper examines mechanisms, if any, adopted by 
the FDRE Constitution to manage the potential clash between state laws on the one hand 
and religious laws and decisions on the other as related to the jurisdiction of sharia courts. 
Whether or not final judgments pronounced by sharia courts are supposed to be 
compatible with the constitutional standards (such as the supremacy clause and human 
rights provisions) are examined. Before doing so, some important issues that serve as a 
framework to put things in context that are related to sharia courts such as their brief 
history in the country, their jurisdiction,, structure, administration, and  place in the legal 
system will be discussed. In addition, few cases decided by sharia courts that shed light 
on practice of exercising their jurisdiction and relationships with courts of law and an 
organ in charge with the task of interpreting the Constitution are reviewed.  The 
discussions on issues raised in the paper are based on the analysis of the relevant 
provisions of the FDRE constitution and laws related to the jurisdiction of sharia courts, 
such as the Sharia Courts Establishment Proclamation, the Civil Code, the Federal Courts 
Establishment Proclamation, etc, and review of few cases decided on by sharia courts 
along with consultation of relevant literature. Sharia courts are set up both the Federal 
and each nine units of the Ethiopian federation and the focus here is on the Federal sharia 
courts and not the Regional ones. 
1. Background 
Islam arrived early in Ethiopia soon after the advent of the message of Prophet 
Mohammed. Ethiopia is the first country that accepted Islam after Arabia and this 
happened following the taking refuge in Ethiopia of some of the followers of the Prophet 
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that suffered persecution at the hands of the then powerful tribe of Mecca, Qureysh, to 
which the Prophet belonged to.  The then Ethiopian king offered kind treatment and 
eventually converted, after considering the message they were persecuted for, as believed 
by Muslims, to Islam.  As a result of the well-treatment of the followers who sought 
refuge and protection in the county, the Prophet ordered Muslims in general and his 
followers to respect and protect Ethiopians and not to offend/attack Ethiopian except in 
self-defence and this instruction is now well-known by Muslims throughout the world. 
An influx of immigrants and traders from South Arabia during the course of the 
following centuries increased the number of Muslims in coastal areas around Ethiopia1, 
in the present day Somalia and Eritrea, and helped Islam to penetrate these areas and 
Islamic law to take root.  The firm presence of Islam in the area created discontent 
between the dominant Christian kingdom, which considered Islam a threat to their areas 
of influence and led to violent conflict at times, the significant of which is the campaign 
spear-headed by Muslim leader commonly called Ahmed Gragn. He uprooted the 
Christian Regime of King Libne Dengel and established his own rule in the central part of 
the country for about 16 years and Ethiopia nearly became to a Muslim state2.  One 
notable attempt by Christians to forcefully convert Muslims against their will was made 
by Emperor Yohannes in the 19th Century but his determination to Convert Muslims did 
not materialize as he was killed in a battle elsewhere in the country. After the present day 
shape of Ethiopia was established by Emperor Menelik II in 19th Century, after a 
successful series of campaigns of expansion of territory, there was no significant clash 
between Muslims and Christians, and the two enjoyed peaceful coexistence. It appears 
that mainly the peaceful coexistence and culture of tolerance between the two, along with 
the de facto existence of Sharia courts in the country for long time and the number of 
Muslims in the country3 propelled the official recognition of the courts in the early 1940s. 
The inception of the federal form of government in 1990s paved the way for explicit 
recognition of sharia courts to deal with some personal matters and gave a constitutional 
status to the courts and allowed them to operate in a different a unique legal framework, 
which also gives rise to some questions regarding their jurisdiction and operation, and 
their relationships with law-applying bodies such as courts and the House of Federation, 
which is  vested with the task of authoritative interpretation of the constitution. 
2. Sharia Courts in Ethiopia: A Brief Historical Account 
 
Shariat courts have been in  de facto existence since the country embraced Islam and the 
growing influence of the religion in the coastal areas surrounding the country4.  However; 
they acquired official state recognition only in 1940s when in 1942, the Proclamation for 
the Establishment of Khadis Courts was issued. The Proclamation defined the jurisdiction 
of sharia courts, which are essentially the same with the present jurisdiction of the courts, 
                                                 
1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_Ethiopia, accessed on 21 August 2010 
2. John Miles, Customary and Islamic Law and Its Development in Africa, Legalbrief Africa, African 
Deveopment Bank, 2004, at 136; See also Jan Abbinik, “Ethiopian Islam and the Challenge of Diversity” 
ISIM Newsletter, Volume 4, 1999, at 24 
3.Muslims account for 33.9 % of the population according to the official Housing and Population Census 
released in 2007 
4. I. S. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, 1965, at 15 
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and provides that the Government would appoint judges serving in the court. This 
proclamation was repealed in 1994 by the Khadis and Naiba Councils Proclamation, 
(Proclamation No. 62/1944), which provided a three set of courts. 
 
The enactment of the 1960 Civil Code, which calls for uniform application of rules 
regarding all civil matters, put the legal status of the courts in limbo.  Article 3347 
provides that “Unless otherwise expressly provided, all rules whether written or customary 
previously in force concerning matters provided for in this code shall be replaced by this 
code and hereby repealed”. Some people contend that the provision repealed the law 
establishing them and the jurisdiction of the courts5.  The repeal of the courts by Article 
3347 is an implied one as the Civil Code contains no rule relating to Muslims in general 
and the courts in particular. In other words, since the Civil Code repealed all other civil 
laws and customary rules and the law was supposed to be uniform throughout the 
country, and that there is no exception made to any group, the argument is that the courts 
are no longer recognized and their jurisdiction to apply Islamic law is annulled6.   
 
A contrary argument is that since such courts were in existence and applying Islamic law 
to some extent, the Civil Code, which makes no reference to the courts, was not intended 
to revoke their jurisdiction in relation to cases within their remit by virtue of existing law7 
It was in consideration, apparently, of the repeal effect of Article 3347 of the Civil Code 
regarding sharia courts that then Minister of Justice instructed, by issuing circular, the 
courts to continue to exercise their jurisdiction defined under the law that set them up8. 
Although not clearly stated, the action of the Minister of Justice seems to be based on the 
assumption that the sharia courts establishment law was affected by the entry into force 
of the Civil Code.  
 
The promulgation of the Civil Code put the legal status of sharia courts in ambiguity and 
uncertainty, which appears to be a deliberate action since Ethiopia at that time was 
struggling to come to grips with, following the entry into force of the Civil Code, the 
question of distinct law for Muslims9.  One can, therefore, see the dilemma following the 
Civil Code- on the one hand the desire for uniform law(legal universalism), and the need 
to take into account important religious law for the Muslim  community on the other. 
Ultimately, the action of the Minster of Justice tilted towards the interest of Muslims and 
entitled the sharia courts to continue their operation amid their status that was put into 
question.  
 
The adoption of the Federal Constitution of Ethiopia brought about a specific legal 
recognition to the sharia courts and put their legal framework in a unique position in the 
sense that it is the first constitution in the country that specifically recognized religious 
                                                 
5.Zaki Mustapha, “The Substantive Law to be Applied by Muslim Courts in Ethiopia”, Journal of 
Ethiopian Laws, Volume 9, No. 1, at 140; see also James C. N. Paul and Christopher Clapham, Ethiopian 
Constitutional Development: A Source Book Volume II, 1971,at 849, citing Robert A. Sedler, “ The 




9 .Paul and Clapham, op. cit., at 849 
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and customary systems of dispute settlement and tried to provide their general areas of 
competence and a general condition attached to their operation.  
 
3. Why Sharia Courts in a Christian-dominated Country? 
 
Although Ethiopia is the first country that embraced Islam after Arabia, the country is 
long considered an Island of Christianity. The Coptic Church had a status of state religion 
up to the early 1974, that it had a significant leverage on would become the king of the 
country in the sense that the Emperor of the kingdom should have the blessing and 
backing of the Church to have a legitimacy to rule the country, that it was entitled to a 
third of the revenue generated by the government, that the political and legal traditions 
were dictated by its precepts, etc. Although there has been a degree of respect and 
tolerance between Muslims and Christians in the country, Ethiopian Muslims were called 
‘Muslims living in the country’ and were not treated as a true citizen of the country. The 
rules considered themselves to be the lord protectors of the Coptic church and relegated 
Muslims to a second-class citizen10. Muslims in the country, especially in the Northern 
part, were disenfranchised owing to the fact that they were excluded from the customary 
land-holding system11. They also were not almost represented in higher political echelons 
and significant military, police security apparatus, and civil service institutions posts, 
especially in a period before 1070s12 . One wonders why the Sharia courts received state 
recognition in 1940s in those prevailing conditions. One reason for the extension of state 
recognition to sharia courts may be ascribed to the largely peaceful co-existence and 
culture of tolerance between Muslims and Christians, which entitled Muslims to practice 
their religion freely13. The second reason may be attributed to a major criticism leveled 
against Ethiopian government, during Emperor Hailesellassie, by Muslims states such as 
Iraq, Egypt, Pakistan, etc accusing the government that Muslims in the country were 
treated a ‘second-class’ citizen for a mere reason of their religion14.  The de jure 
recognition of the courts may be an act of appeasing foreign criticism and showing that 
Muslims had the right to be governed by their own religious law. Another factor that 
explains the recognition of sharia courts in the country is that historically, family 
relations, which have been the focus of jurisdiction of the courts before and since their 
recognition in 1940s and even at the present day, have been based on each communities 
religions and customary norms15. Muslims are predominantly concentrated in the 
peripheries of the country where the penetration of state laws are minimal(because of 
lack of infrastructure, scarcity of resources and man-power and lack of effective state 
apparatus, etc), and they traditionally rely on long existing sharia courts to settle private 
and family matters, and this state of affairs may have forced the government to recognize 
them as they constitute  the main forum for dispensing justice for Muslims in certain 
matters. This may be why the Emperor heeded the request of Muslims to set up a 
                                                 
10.Bahru Zewde, A Modern History of Ethiopia: 1885-1974, 2nd eds., Addis Ababa University Press, 2001, 
at 7 
11.Ibid 
12.Jan Abbinik, supra note 2, op. cit., at 24 
13.Ibid; see also Paul and Clapham, supra note 5, op. cit., at 849 
14.John Miles, supra note 2, op. cit., at  137 
15.Ibid; see also Paul and Clapham, supra note 5, op. cit., 849. Christians had such courts that deal with 
family issues and their jurisdiction was abolished in 1940s 
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government-backed sharia courts in 1940s and this along with the criticism of some states 
and the de facto existence of the courts for a long time in dealing with family and private 
matters have lead to their official recognition of the state. 
 
The fact that the Government comes to grips with the reality that family matters that are 
governed by religious laws and institutions are virtually important to Muslim community 
and decided to continue to recognize sharia courts can be gleaned from the action taken 
by the Minister of Justice following the adoption of the Civil Code of 1060, which call 
for uniform application of civil laws in the country. Personal and family affairs codes are 
intrinsically tied with the preservation of one’s culture and identity and if Muslims were 
forced to be governed by the uniform law, as envisaged by the Civil Code that abolishes 
all religious and customary laws, it would result in a staging of resistance by Muslims 
and could bring about upheavals in the country16. That is why the Ministry of Justice 
issued circular so that sharia courts could continue to function despite the legal status that 
was put in limbo by a provision of the Civil Code, Article 3347.  
 
4. Jurisdiction of Sharia Courts 
 
 The jurisdiction of sharia courts since they were set up by state official law in 1940s is 
and remains the same-they are granted mandate in two types of cases, which are provide 
under Article 4of the Sharia Courts Proclamation, Proclamation No. 188/199917. It is in 
fact in the areas of family law that the influence of religious as well as customary rules 
are most visible and the jurisdiction conferred upon sharia courts is made in recognition 
of this fact18. As is plain from the provision on jurisdiction of sharia courts, personal and 
family matters are the only areas in civil cases to which Islamic law applies and thus 
sharia courts are denied the power to deal with many civil, criminal, commercial, etc 
matters. This is the case with sharia courts in many countries save for full blown 
theocracies, such as Saudi Arabia, that confine the jurisdiction of the courts to matters 
affecting  personal status of Muslims19.  
 
The FDRE Constitution does not determine the specific jurisdiction granted to sharia 
courts, it rather recognizes the possibility of settlement of personal disputes by customary 
and religious systems. It does not define the personal matters amenable to the jurisdiction 
of such systems either. However, the Constitution provides the general areas of 
competence(i.e., that means personal matters) and condition attached(i.e., consent of 
parties) to the exercise of jurisdiction  by sharia courts. The specific types of cases falling 
within the competence of sharia courts are defined under the sharia courts establishment 
                                                 
16 . Paul ad Clapham, supra note 5, op. cit, at 849 
17.Article 4 of the Sharia Courts Establishment Proclamation provides that the courts have jurisdiction any 
question regarding marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship of minors and family relations; provided 
that the marriage to which the question relates was concluded, or the parties have consented to be 
adjudicated in accordance with Islamic law; any question regarding Wakf, gift succession of wills, provided 
the endower or donor is a Muslim or the deceased was a Muslim at the time of his death 
18.The old and new family codes recognize the validity of marriage concluded as per religious rules and 
ceremonies. 
19.Zaki Mustapha, supra note 5, op. cit., at 138 
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proclamation that was promulgated pursuant to Articles 34(5) and 78(5) of the 
constitution. 
 
Apart from determining jurisdiction of sharia courts, the proclamation as well as the 
Constitution provides a condition attached to the exercise of jurisdiction by sharia courts-
the precondition of consent of parties. Sharia courts do not, therefore, have a compulsory 
jurisdiction over parties on matters falling within their reach unless both parties 
demonstrate their express and unequivocal consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
courts20. There is no clear guideline as to when and how the consent of the parties must 
be expressed21. However, one can draw the rules from the Civil Procedure Code as the 
sharia courts proclamation provides that the rules of procedure governing the proceedings 
before the sharia courts are those of the Civil Code22. Normally, a party who files a case 
as a plaintiff is said to have shown his consent to the court as institution of a case to the 
court indicates that the party is willing to get his case settled by the court. The problem 
with the consent of a party against whom a claim is made-how and when to establish a 
clear and express consent of the defendant and concerning the consent of the defendant, 
the Proclamation provides that there shall be attached, a long with the notice to be served 
on the defendant, a form in which the defendant declares that he/she expressly consents 
to the hearing of a case by sharia courts. It is possible that the defendant may not fill in 
the declaration but appear during the opening of hearing of the suit and raise his/her 
objection orally against the exercise of jurisdiction by a sharia court. Some of the issues 
in connection with securing consent of parties will be reviewed in the section entitled 
“Main Issues in relation to Jurisdiction and Performance of Sharia Courts”. 
 
Another condition attached to the exercise of jurisdiction by sharia courts is that the 
jurisdiction can only be invoked where the marriage is governed by Islamic Law, which 
normally means that the parties are Muslims and have concluded marriage according to 
Islamic Law, or where the parties consent to get their cases handled by sharia courts, 
which means that non-Muslims can also appear before sharia courts so long as they 
consent to get their case settled by the sharia courts. Thus, both Muslims and non-
Muslims can approach sharia courts to have their case resolved by them.  
 
5. Structure and Administration of Shariat Courts and Procedural Issues 
 
The Sharia court is of a three-tiered structure: the Supreme Court of Sharia, the High 
Court of Sharia and the First Instance Court of Sharia each with its own necessary 
number of Kadis, judges and has registrar and other personnel to run the activities of the 
court.  The sharia courts are held accountable to the Judicial Administration Council, an 
organ in charge of, among others, recruiting and dealing with disciplinary matters of 
judges.  The courts are established, staffed and funded by the government. They do not 
form part of the regular court of the land, are distinct from regular court structure and not 
subordinate to the regular court unlike the case in Kenya where they are subordinate to 
the High Court. This is clear from the provision in the Sharia proclamation, which 
                                                 
20.See Article 34(5) of the Federal constitution and Article 4(2) of the Sharia Courts Proclamation 
21.John Miles, supra note 2, op. cit., at 142 
22 .Article 6(2) of the Shari Court proclamation 
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provides that once a case is submitted to sharia court after meeting all procedural 
requirements, it may not be transferred to regular courts and vice versa23.  It is in the 
anticipation of the inevitable clash between the substantive law applied by and decisions 
of sharia court on the one hand and forma state law rules that such provision is inserted in 
the sharia proclamation in order to delineate a clear line between them. 
 
In considering matters falling within their competence, sharia courts supposed to apply 
substantive Islamic law. However, they are obliged to follow the rules relating to civil 
proceedings used by ordinary civil courts in undertaking their activities in hearing and 
disposing cases appearing before them--i.e., substantive sharia law is to be enforced by 
Civil Procedure Code governing the proceedings before ordinary civil courts. For 
instance, hearing proceedings, production and administration of evidence, execution of 
judgments, etc of sharia courts are regulated by the rules of the Civil Procedure Code. 
There is anomaly in the application of rules of civil Procedure of ordinary courts to sharia 
courts as the former may conflict with the rules of the latter, which will be touched on in 
the next section. 
 
6.  Main Issues in relation to Jurisdiction and Performance of Shariat Courts 
 
Here, attempt is made to discuss major issues that the jurisdiction of sharia courts spark 
and their performance at the Federal level.  The performance of sharia courts is examined 
on the basis of some few cases decided by them, which were reviewed by the Federal 
Supreme Court and the House of Federation, the final arbiter of constitutional disputes in 
Ethiopia. The cases highlight the relationship between sharia courts and ordinary court 
system and authoritative interpreter of the constitution, mechanism used by the 
constitution to deal with the clash between state law and the different normative ordering 
made possible by recognition of legal pluralism, and issues related to securing the express 
consent of both parties.  
 
 6.1. Issues related to Securing Express Consent of both Parties 
 
Sharia Courts can see cases only when parties expressly indicate their consent to the 
exercise of jurisdiction by shartai courts.  Cases decided show that if it is established that 
no express consent was secured by sharia courts before it decided on a case, the final 
decision rendered by the courts can be reviewed by the Federal Supreme Court and the 
House of federation. One famous case in this regard is known as the Kedija Beshir case24. 
Kedija got a house following the passing away of her husband. Close relatives of her 
husband lodged a case to the First Instance Sharia courts with a view to claiming a share 
from the estate. She raised an unequivocal objection to the jurisdiction of the court. In 
spite of her clear objection, the court considered the case and finally decided on the claim 
filed by the relatives of her husband and forced her to surrender the house she acquired. 
She appealed against the decision to the High and Supreme Sharia Courts, both of which 
confirmed the decision of the First Instance Sharia Court. She submitted her application 
for cassation division of the Federal Supreme Court, pursuant to Articles 80(3) and 
                                                 
23.See Article 5(4) of the Sharia Courts Proclamation 
24.Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division File No. 12400/1999 
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Article 10 of the Federal Courts establishment Proclamation (Proclamation No. 25/1996) 
which lists down cases fit for the review by cassation, which also decided against her by 
saying that there was no fundamental error of law in the decisions made by all the Sharia 
Courts that could lead to the review of the case. The Ethiopian Women Lawyers 
Association acted on behalf of Kedija and brought the case to the House of Federation, 
the final arbiter of constitutional case, by alleging that the consideration of the case by all 
the Sharia courts involved in deciding on her case amounts to the violation of the 
constitution as they considered the case while she expressly objected to the exercise of 
jurisdiction by sharia courts. The House of Federation decided that the decision was 
unconstitutional by saying that is only regular courts that have compulsory jurisdiction 
and that the jurisdiction of sharia courts is based on consent of jurisdiction and made 
reference to Article 34(4) of the Constitution. It also rejected the reasoning of Sharia that 
the requirement of consent under thP Sharia Courts proclamation does not apply to the 
case as the case was filed before the Proclamation was enacted and appeared in the 
official law reporter in the country, the Negarit Gazzeta25.  
The case shows that if a sharia court proceeds to see and decide on a case without 
securing the express consent of the parties, the decision can be reviewed on procedural 
ground of failure to comply with consent requirement by both the Federal Supreme Court 
and the House of Federation. However, if one reads the provision of the sharia 
Proclamation, a case filed to sharia courts may not be reviewed by ordinary courts and 
vice versa and this rule seems to bar the possibility of review of decision of sharia courts 
by ordinary Federal Courts in general and the Federal Supreme Court in particular. The 
Federal Supreme Court reviewed the case through it cassation division on the basis of 
Article 80(3)(a) of the Federal Constitution and Article 10 of the Federal Courts 
Proclamation. The relevance of Article 80(3) of the constitution to justify jurisdiction of 
the Federal Supreme Court to review final decisions of sharia courts on the basis of 
failure to secure the express consent of parties through cassation is doubtful. Article 
80(3)(a) says “The Federal Supreme Court has a power of cassation over any final court 
decision containing a basic error of law. Particulars shall be determined by law”. Does the 
phrase “any final court decision’ under Article 80(3) include decisions of sharait courts? 
The scope of Article 80(3) appears to be limited to final decisions of regular courts, be it 
federal and regional courts and does not seem to extend to shariat courts as the preceding 
sub-articles talk only of the regular courts. This is bolstered by Article 10 of the Federal 
Courts Proclamation, Proclamation No. 25/96 that specifies the types of final decision of 
regular courts that qualify for review by cassation and the cassation powers of the 
Supreme Court under this Article makes explicit reference only to regular courts and does 
not cover final decisions delivered by shariat courts26. 
                                                 
25.The proclamation had not entered into force when the case was filed but entered into force when Khadija 
appeared for the first hearing of the suit. The sharia court said the proclamation would not apply to an 
already filed case but the HF said this is immaterial as what is important is securing the consent of parties 
as the constitution provides the requirement of express consent under Article 34 (5) and this can be done at 
the first hearing of the suit, irrespective of whether or not the Proclamation entered into force, which has 
been done by Khadija, and thus rejected the argument of sharia court. 
26.The final decision subject to cassation review by the Supreme Court cassation division include final 
decisions of the Federal High Court rendered in its appellate jurisdiction,  final decisions of the regular 
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The review made by Hose of Federation is justified on the basis of the constitutional 
provisions mandating the House to make a final authoritative decision on all 
constitutional disputes and on the provisions in proclamations relating to power of the 
House.  But as will be seen in the next section, the review made by the House is confined 
to procedural question and not in relation to substantive final decisions of sharia courts 
 
In another case(Abdurahman Ali et al Vs Hajji Kassim Mohammed and Zenit Ali), 
Kassim Mohammed and Zenit Ali concluded marriage before a judge in the presence of 
two witness of their choice.  Close relative of Zenit, her two brothers and an uncle, filed 
an objection to the marriage before the First Instance Sharia Court alleging that there was 
no consent of her parents and relatives to the marriage and argued that parents and 
relatives must, as per Islamic law, show their willingness to the marriage concluded by 
their girl and that they were never consulted as to whether or not they consent to the 
conclusion of the marriage.  The couple knew that the parents and close relatives of Zenit 
would not consent to their marriage and ignored them and lade their own arrangement to 
appear before a judge for conclusion of marriage, and that explains why they did not 
invite relatives and parents to attend the process before a judge. They did not express 
their consent to the Court but the Court decided to annul their marriage. The couples 
appealed to both the High and Supreme Sharia Courts, which upheld the decision of the 
lower court. It is clear that the decision of all the three levels of the sharia courts in this 
case is contrary to the clear provision of the sharia courts establishment proclamation and 
the relevant provision of the federal constitution on consent for sharia courts to see a 
case.  
 
Another problem in relation to consent is that the shariat courts are lenient towards 
securing the express consent of parties. They do not usually ask parties in express terms 
as to whether or nor the parties consent to their jurisdiction at the date of the first 
appearance of the parties before them. They seem to operate with the presumption that 
the parties have consented to their jurisdiction. The undisclosed reason for this is perhaps 
the judges have adopted a stance that once the parties are Muslims, it means that they 
have agreed to be governed by it and thus they will be committed to it by their prior 
consent. The problem is exacerbated by the behavior of the parties-parties do not usually 
express their explicit rejection of the jurisdiction of sharia courts for fear that they may 
face negative perception and reaction from fellow Muslim community and/or that they 
feel that such express objection is tantamount to offending one’s own religion and 
deviating from religious beliefs or because they are put under social pressure not to 
demonstrate their clear objection to the assumption of jurisdiction by sharia courts.  
 
6.2. Problems related to Procedures Governing Sharia Courts Proceedings 
 
The proceedings before sharia courts are governed by the rules of civil proceedings used 
by ordinary civil courts and this creates anomaly between two different laws. The 
application of civil procedure of ordinary courts to proceedings before shariat courts may 
                                                                                                                                                 
division of the Supreme Court, and final decisions of the Regional Supreme courts rendered as a regular 
division or in its appellate jurisdiction. This makes it plain that it is only final decisions of regular courts 
that qualify for reviewed by cassation and not that of sharia court. 
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compromise the effective operation of the courts. The sharia/Islamic law in general has a 
simplified procedures in areas of production and administration of evidence, requirement 
on number of witness and their examination, hearing of parties, etc. The application of 
civil procedure compromise this simplicity, and could even be in conflict with the 
substantive Islamic law27.  It appears that is the lack of a ready-made Islamic rule of 
procedure that forced the law-maker to prescribe Civil Procedure for the proceedings of 
sharia courts. If a codified rule of procedures of sharia courts is managed to be put in 
place, the courts may use their own procedure and this requires the amendment of the 
existing sharia courts proclamation in future. 
 
6.3. Lack of Consistency in Decisions 
 
Sharia courts apply substantive sharia laws in limited cases as defined under Article 4 of 
the Sharia Courts Proclamation. Although the law they apply is not explicitly stated, one 
can easily derive this from the very article that defines their jurisdiction. Articles 4 and 6 
of the Sharia Courts proclamation say they see the cases in accordance with Islamic law. 
There is, however, absence of guiding rules for settlement of disputes lodged to sharia 
courts on different matters within their reach and thus judgments to be pronounced 
depends ultimately on school of thought a judge succumbs to.  In Sunni Islam, there are 
four schools of thought and three of them are found in Ethiopia, the predominant of 
which is claimed to be the Shaffie school28.  On different issues save the basic pillar of 
the faith and some limited issues regarding primary sources of Islamic law( the Quran 
and Sunna),  there are different opinions among Islamic jurists. The judges may be from 
different school of thought and this may make decisions on same matters not consistent, 
especially on maters in relation to the secondary sources of Islamic Law( the scholastic 
consensus and analogy), which depend much on the opinion of judges. Accompanied by 
the absence of a codified and uniform Islamic substantive law to be applied by the sharia 
courts on matters falling within their mandate, the likelihood of decisions not to be 
consistent regarding essentially same matters is high. The absence of such rules means 
that there are no guiding rules for settlement of disputes lodged to sharia courts on 




The Federal constitution of Ethiopia professes a secular democracy that makes solemn 
commitment to fundamental rights. Secularism is one of the basic principles of the 
constitution and as such state and religion are separate and each is obliged not to interfere 
in the business of the other29. However, sharia courts, although not part of the regular 
court structure, are set up, staffed and funded by the government. As raised elsewhere, 
one could challenge the legitimacy of these courts on the basis of secularism and rule of 
                                                 
27.Ibrahim Idris, “Status of Federal Sharia Courts under the 1994 FDRE Constitution”, in Center for 
Contemporary Islam, Islamic Law in Africa Project, University of Cape town, Proceedings of Symposium, 
2002 
28.Zaki Mustapha, supra note 5, op. cit., at 143 
29.See Article 11 of the FDRE Constitution 
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law as the government establishes and provides budget to them and makes different law 
for a certain categories of people based on their religion. 
 
Invoking secularism to challenge the very establishment of sharia courts is, at its face 
value, a legitimate concern. However, the concern for secularism is watered-down by 
freedom of choice (i.e., parties may opt to get their matter settled by sharia courts by their 
own volition) and is also a necessary compromise made for the sake protecting a minority 
religion. To ensure and guarantee the respect of secularism, the federal constitution of 
Ethiopia made sure that a provision was put in it that safeguarded parties to disputes a 
choice of forum-that is to say not to be compelled to be subjected to the jurisdiction of 
the courts30.  Muslims have been living with Christians in a culture of tolerance and they 
have been resorting to the de facto existing sharia courts for a long time and the 
constitution gave them de jure recognition in consideration of this reality and the fact that 
they are a significant minority. Apart from this, the embracing of legal pluralism by the 
Constitution makes it necessary to compromise the notion of secularism. 
 
7.  Legal Pluralism, Shariat Courts and Human Rights Issues 
 
Legal pluralism is capable of different connotations, depending on contexts in which it is 
employed. In one sense, it refers primarily to the incorporation or recognition of 
customary norms or institutions within state law or to the independent co-existence of 
indigenous norms and institutions alongside state law, whether or not officially 
recognized31. Legal pluralism makes it inevitable that there are multiplicity of legal 
orders that are diverse, uncoordinated, co-existing or overlapping bodies of law32.  As 
such, it gives rise to diverse source of normative ordering, some of which include, official 
legal system, customary , religious,, functional, community, and capitalist systems33.  The 
advantages of the existence of non-state laws made possible as a result of recognition of 
legal pluralism include the followings: they are said to be ‘closer’ geographically and 
culturally, more accessible and flexible, well-suited to address deep conflicts, relatively 
inexpensive, the overall burden of engaging with them is considerably less that in the 
case of state’s legal system, etc34.  Some of the demerits of legal pluralism are that they 
are not sensitive to human rights of individuals, non- conformity or even difference, 
which leads to those on the structural margins of the community experiencing 
discrimination, they give rise to competing clams of authority, impose conflicting 
demands of norms, etc35.  The diverse source of normative ordering made possible as a 
result of legal pluralism are poised to clash with each other and state laws, particularly 
when their underlining norms and processes are inconsistent, and such clashes are the 
                                                 
30.Majamba, “Possibility and Rationale of establishing Khadi Courts in Tanzania Mainland”,  Paper 
Presented at the Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania Workshop, University of Dar Es 
Salaam, 2007, at 18 
31.Brian Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global”, Sydney Law 
Review, Volume  30, 2007, at 390 
32.Ibid, 375 
33 .Ibid, 397; see also International Council on Human Rights Policy, “An Approach Paper: Research 
Project on Plural Legal Orders and Human Rights, 2008, at 4 
34.International Council on Human Rights Policy , op. cit., at 5 
35 .Ibid, see also Tamanaha, op. cit., 375 
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most dynamic aspect of legal pluralism36.  There are different schemes adopted by states 
to deal with such discords through, for instance, provisions like conflict rules, choice of 
la rules, etc37.  Some of the specific provisions to manage the conflicts among different 
normative ordering include the following: 
A. One common arrangement is for official state legal system to assume a position of 
neutrality with respect to the various communities and religions, allowing a degree 
of autonomy to each38. The exemption of normative ordering from compliance with 
state law could fall here, such as the clause in Zambian and Zimbabwean 
constitutions, which exempt customary norms from compliance with the 
constitutional standard39.  
B. Another mechanism is for state law to absorb competing systems and a common 
mechanism in this respect is to explicitly recognize customary, religious, economic, 
or community norms, or to explicitly recognize and lend some support(financial or 
coercive) to existing customary, religious, community or economic norms40.  There 
are different means to achieve this purpose. The state may, for instance, choose, like 
India, Pakistan or Niger, to recognize or even create institutions outside the formal 
state legal system to mediate and resolve disputes41. In other words, the state legal 
system recognizes the validity of private arbitration decisions, or even encourage 
parties to have recourse to such arbitration42.  The other mechanism here is that the 
state may allow the application of different normative ordering but limits its scope.  
For instance, the official state law, such as in Israel, Malaysia, Indonesia, etc, may 
permit for the application of different laws, especially those affecting personal 
status(such as marriage, adoption, divorce, etc) to different people depending on 
their religious identity, or, for example allowing indigenous people to be subject to 
their own customary, such as in USA, Canada, etc43.  
C. The other means is for state official system to recognize the special status of 
customary system but only in so far as they are not contrary to constitutional 
standards, such as in South Africa44  
D. Another option available is for state law to make aggressive effort to suppress the 
different normative ordering that are in conflict with state law-declaring them to be 
illegal and trying to eliminate them45.  
 
Now, let us see how the Ethiopian federal constitution tries to deal with legal pluralism 
and the relationships between different normative ordering and the concern for human 
rights issues. Before directly delving into the discussion, it is good to have a brief glance 
at the general constitutional framework related to the issues subject to discussion here. 
 
                                                 
36.Tamamaha, op. cit., at 400 
37.Ibid, at 400, and 403-407 
38 .Ibid 
39 .International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra note 33, op. cit., at 6 
40 Tamanaha, supra note 31, op. cit., at 404 
41 .International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra note 33, op. cit., at 6 
42 .Tamanaha, supra note 31, op. cit., at 404 
43.International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra note 33, op. cit., at 6 
44 .Ibid 
45 .Tamanaha, supra note 31, op. cit., at 404 
  13 
Cultural diversity is a trait that has a deep root in Ethiopia as manifested by the existence 
of different ethnic, linguistic and religious groups(There are about 82 ethnic groups 
speaking about 80 different languages). The main three religions (Christianity, Islam, and 
Judaism (although the followers of Judaism has been dwindling following the emigration 
Ethiopian Jews to Israel) along with various traditional beliefs are embraced and 
practiced in the country. Ethno-linguistic and religious diversity resulted in the presence 
of various customary norms and religious laws. In a stark contrast to the past 
constitutions, the incumbent federal constitution of 1995 took a bold step and accorded, 
in explicit terms, recognition to customary and religious laws in settling disputes related 
to personal matters, giving rise to legal pluralism, regardless of the pros and cons that 
may be raised against such system. On the other side of the spectrum, the constitution 
gave due emphasis to human rights, with almost 1/3 of the 106 provisions of the 
constitution devoted to human rights. Apart from this, the constitution provides that 
human rights instruments ratified by the country are integral part of the law of the 
country, that it is the supreme law of the land and as such laws, decisions and customary 
practices, etc that are against it shall be of no effect, and that it provisions on human 
rights shall be interpreted in conformity with international human rights instruments 
adopted by the country46. One of the challenges of legal pluralism is the uniform 
application of human rights in the country, which is envisaged under the constitution. It is 
clear that there is a tension between legal pluralism (which is in favor of particularity in 
application) on the one hand and the human rights instruments adopted by the country 
and enshrined under the constitution on the other (which are universal in nature and 
require uniform application). Different normative ordering recognized under the 
Constitution could constrain the uniform application of human rights enshrined under the 
constitution as their underpinning norms and processes are obviously bound to differ in 
many instances. One typical example that can be cited here is the constitutional guarantee 
of gender equality on the one hand and the treatment of women in the customary and 
religious laws and systems.  
 
For our purpose here, on matters falling within the competence of sharia courts, the 
courts apply substantive sharia law, which has a different perception and approach to 
issues of gender equality. There are different ways of treating women in Islamic law that 
are to be applied by the courts in such areas like divorce, partition of property, 
inheritance, etc. How can one reconcile the different treatment of women with issues 
such as the gender equality and non-discrimination under the Constitution? Which 
mechanism is used by the Ethiopian constitution when the decisions rendered by sharia 
courts are alleged to be against the provisions of the Constitution or its human rights 
norms? Should decisions of the sharia courts be in compliance with the Constitutional 
standard? In other words, does the supremacy clause under Article 9 of the FDRE 
constitution apply to decisions of sharia courts that are alleged to contravene the 
                                                 
46 .Article 9(1) of the FDRE Constitution provides “The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Any 
law, customary practice or a decision of an organ of state or a public official which contravenes this 
Constitution shall be of no effect”. Article 13(2) says  “The fundamental rights and freedoms specified in 
this Chapter shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the principles of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and International instruments adopted by 
Ethiopia. 
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Constitutional standard set by Article 9? Do the human rights provisions that are 
accorded due emphasis under the constitution override judgments of sharia courts that are 
found to be against the human rights norms enshrined under the constitution? Can the 
House of Federation as an authoritative interpreter of the Constitution review final 
substantive decisions of sharia courts and declare them to be unconstitutional?  
 
The constitution has not used an explicit rule unlike in some countries to deal with the 
potential conflicts between state laws and the various normative ordering given 
recognition under it. On the one hand the Constitution contains a supremacy  clause that 
provides that any law, decision and customary practices that go contrary to the spirit of 
the constitution shall be of no effect and this in a way means that decisions of, for 
instance, shariat courts that are alleged to be in transgression of the constitutional 
provisions are of no effect. On the other hand the constitution has an express provision 
that provides constitutional recognition and status to settlement of disputes related to 
personal matters by customary and religious ways when parties refer a matter to such 
institution though their own consent(See Article 34/35 and Article 78 of the constitution). 
This impliedly means that the constitution acknowledges the difference in the norms and 
processes between state law on the one hand and customary and religious laws on the 
other but tolerates their final decision in matters affecting personal status of individuals   
when they voluntarily submit their cases to such institutions. This argument is reinforced 
by the arrangement under the sharia court establishment proclamation.  The Proclamation 
on sharia courts enacted by virtue of the recognition stated under the constitution 
provides that once a case is submitted to sharia courts after meeting all procedural 
requirements, there is no way to take the matter to the regular courts of courts and vice 
versa as indicated under Article 5(4) of the Sharia Courts proclamation.  It appears that 
the supremacy clause under Article 9(1) of the constitution does not apply to decisions of 
sharia courts even if the substantive decisions made by sharia courts are discriminatory in 
nature or in conflict with human right issues under the constitution and such decision are 
treated as exceptions to Article 9(1)47. Even if the constitution fails to explicitly state so, 
unlike the case in Zambia and Zimbabwe, it appears that the constitution exempts 
personal matters settled by religious and customary institutions from compliance with the 
standard under Article 9(1).  This is because reviewing such decisions and declaring them 
unconstitutional means that the sharia courts have no role in having full control over 
personal and family matters that are virtually important to Muslims and the manifestation 
of their identity. It also implies imposing of uniform laws on Muslims regarding even 
matters intrinsically associated with them, which means ignoring a special function of 
sharia courts, which is to serve the interest of Muslims in some areas. Furthermore, it also 
goes against the very essence of legal pluralism advocated by the Constitution , which 
entitles religious and customary norms to deal with cases of parties on matters affecting 
their personal status.  Thus final decisions made by sharia courts on matters within their 
remit may be treated an exception to constitutional standard set under Article 9(1).  This 
arrangement raises question about Ethiopia’s commitment under various human rights 
                                                 
47.The House of Federation may review the decision off sharia courts on procedural grounds such as failure 
to comply with express consent or that the courts exceed mandate granted to them but it is not entitled to 
deal with substantive matters falling within the jurisdiction of the courts so long as the parties consent to 
the case being seen by the courts and the matter is within the scope of the courts. 
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instruments ratified by the country that contain provisions prohibiting discrimination 
against women. This is because personal status laws, which fall in Ethiopia within the 
jurisdiction of sharia courts, are often considered the area of law in which discrimination 
on the ground of gender is solidly entrenched48. The constitutional provisions that give 
recognition to customary and religious institution to settle personal disputes subject to 
consent of parties may not be in conformity with the provisions of these instruments 
regarding equality and the equal application of human rights to all human beings 
regardless of their religion, status, etc and the protection against discrimination on any 
ground. This in turn triggers issues related to the status of international human rights 
under the Federal constitution, which is not the subject of this paper. What appears to be 
impliedly evident from the constitution is that particularity of application of  some human 
rights issues are given preference over universal application of laws and this is done for 
the sake of religious and customary rules governing personal status when parties choose 




The jurisdiction granted to sharia courts raises questions and concerns about human rights 
provisions enshrined under the Federal Constitution-gender equality, protection against 
discrimination, etc. However, the Constitution has not provided a specific mechanism as 
to how to decisions of sharia courts that are in conflict with constitutional standards can 
be dealt with. In other words, the Constitution fails to clearly state whether or not its 
supremacy clause and provisions on human rights sway over conflicting final decisions of 
sharia courts. It appears that the Constitution has made final decisions delivered by sharia 
courts an exception to its supremacy clause and human rights norms, i.e., concerning 
some matters affecting personal status that can be settled by customary and religious 
courts, the constitution appears to adopt a stance of tolerance and thus they are not 
supposed to be compatible with the constitutional standard although they may be conflict 
with such standard. This is made in favor of the pluralism encouraged by the constitution 
itself. This brings into picture question about Ethiopia’s commitment under the various 
human rights treaties it has ratified that guarantee equality and protection against 
discrimination based on any ground gender. However, one could at the end say that to the 
extent of personal matters, the notion of ‘cultural relativism’ prevails over universality of 
human rights so far as decisions of sharia courts are concerned. 
 
                                                 
48 .Jasmine Mousa, The Reform of Sharia-derived Divorce Legislation in Egypt: International Standards 
and the culture Debate, 2005, at 1 
